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Abstract.  We analyse the recent wave of political instability in Bolivia in the context of a ‘poverty trap’ 
model which suggests that elements in a country’s political system, as well as its economic structure, 
may be instrumental in perpetuating  a state of poverty. In Bolivia the costs of adjustment in the recent 
phase have been very severe, with well over a hundred killed between 1999 and  2007 as a direct 
consequence of demonstrations against aspects of the globalisation and adjustment process, and an 
appearance of a return to a state of chronic political instability; other countries affected by the global 
crisis have suffered less severely. Is this because they used the available instruments of adjustment 
more effectively, or for other reasons? In particular, how does poverty impact fit into the story: would a 
‘more effective’ pattern of adjustment have been more pro-poor? 
 
There is no doubt that some aspects of the Bolivian political economy do have to be taken as parametric 
and have, over many years, played a major part in increasing the vulnerability of the political system and 
in predisposing it, in recent years, towards instability. These include: the collapse of conventional party 
politics as an instrument for representing the interests of the poor; the decay of a number of key 
institutions including the courts, financial institutions and standards of fiscal governance; and the unique 
combination, within the satellite city of El Alto, of strategic location, unemployment rising much faster 
than conventional poverty indicators, and very high levels of politicisation and strategic communication 
between neighbourhood groups. All of these factors applied a process of hysteresis, or a vicious circle 
of downward pressure, to levels of trust in government (not only amongst the Quechua/Aymara majority, 
but also among the urban middle class) by the centre-right coalitions of the 1990s, and the persistence 
of this dynamic seriously limited the government’s room for economic policy manoeuvre as it tried to 
extract itself from recession in 1999-2004. 
 
However, we also argue, there is clear evidence, in the Bolivian case, of some incorrect decisions (from 
the point of view of minimising social cost and political instability) having been taken, not because they 
were politically inescapable but simply because the necessary strategic vision was lacking. Our major 
examples, from the climactic year of 2003, relate to fiscal policy and policy towards the privatisation and 
pricing of oil and gas exports; but several other areas where the breadth of government vision during the 
crisis was not sufficiently wide include pensions policy, agricultural policy and international policy 
options, including capital controls and exchange rate management. A component of these errors, 
especially in the case of fiscal and privatisation policy, consists in not seeing how politically damaging  a 
policy which overtly threatened to increase unemployment and inequality was likely to be. We argue that 
the aid donors were complicit in allowing those mistakes to happen: in not helping the Bolivian 
government to broaden its strategic field of vision. 
 
In international perspective, it appears that Bolivia was hampered in its efforts to escape the political 
poverty trap by its low levels of institutional capacity, its high and deteriorating levels of inequality and 
unemployment, and the apparent indifference of government to measures which might have relieved 
these ills (such as increases in the social efficiency wage, and protection against instability on the 
external capital account). There seems little doubt that the overall regressive stance of policy, coupled 
with communication and institutional failures, played a part in locking Bolivia into a worse crisis than 
other afflicted countries; but policy was not uniformly regressive, and part of the problem appears to be 
that the Bolivian government was watching the wrong indicators of what might make it politically 
vulnerable.   
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1.  Introduction: political violence and varieties of stabilisation 
experience 
                On 12 and 13 October, 2003, over sixty people
2 were killed in a 
confrontation between civilian protesters and the armed forces in the city of El Alto, 
Bolivia. The incident marked the climax of a series of disturbances which have 
continued through to the present year, and which mark Bolivia as one of the gravest 
sufferers, in human terms, from the wave of capital-account crises which have 
buffeted the developing world since their onset in East Asia in 1997. The variety of 
experiences of adjustment-related conflict across the developing world since 1997 is 
illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Countries affected by global crisis(1997-2005): political 
responses and their consequences 
 
Country  Year of entering 
crisis 
Duration of 
crisis (years of 
negative growth in 
per capita GDP 








Thailand 1997  1  0 
South Korea  1997  2  2 
Indonesia* 1997  2  30 
Malaysia* 1998  1  0 
Russia* 1998  3  25 
Turkey 1998  2  20 
Brazil 1999  1  no  data 
Argentina* 2000  3  12 
Bolivia*  2000 6  140 
 
Sources and definitions. Onset of crisis is defined as first year of negative per capita GDP growth, 
and duration of crisis is defined as number of years of negative per capita GDP growth after 
onset;source is World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. Estimated deaths from 
political violence associated with crisis (street demonstrations, riots, roadblocks, and crisis-related 
industrial violence) are provisional estimates derived from contemporary newspaper accounts under 
ESRC project RES-156-25-00016, The political economy of pro-poor adjustment. For more detail of 
computation see Mosley(2006), appendix 2. 
 
It is clear from the table that the interaction between the social costs of crisis and the 
political consequences was in some cases (eg South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand)  
short-term and self-correcting, but in other cases (eg Indonesia, Turkey and Bolivia) 
much more long-term and self-reinforcing. In this paper we seek to understand why 
these differences in response-pattern occur, with particular reference to the case of 
Bolivia, where the recent crisis has restored an ancestral pattern of instability (Figure 
1)  following an apparently successful escape from the vicious circle during the  
1990s. Our concern is both to explain the particularities of why recovery has proved 
so elusive in Bolivia, and also in more general terms to illustrate what the lessons 
may be for institutions and governments which may have responsibility for dealing 
with crises of this type in the future.  
                                                 




One approach to crisis recovery strategies, often attributed to the International 
Monetary Fund, explains the effectiveness of reform strategies in terms of technical 
criteria, e.g. the speed with which particular economic policy instruments 
(expenditure cuts, tax increases, devaluation, and so on) are able to stabilise the 
currency. It can be argued, however, that what is in principle technically effective may 
not be in practice politically feasible or sustainable, that the political violence and 
policy instability portrayed in Table 1 are in part the consequence of this, and that as 
a result what is optimal in a technical sense may not be optimal if the likely political 
consequences of economic policy are taken into consideration. In particular, it may 
be necessary to orient adjustment policies more towards poor people than is 
necessary according to criteria of technical effectiveness, in order to obviate the risks 
of rebellion by poor people who are damaged by adjustment.  
This idea has been explored, and rejected, by the very comprehensive OECD studies 
of social and political consequences of adjustment (Bourguignon et al. 1992; 
Haggard et al. 1995).Their conclusion, reached on the basis of empirical data from 
the 1980s and early 1990s, is that, although criteria of political feasibility are 
important in determining the right adjustment policy,  ‘a focus on social equity is not 
necessarily relevant to understanding the politics of adjustment, because the 
politically most active groups are not usually the poorest’
3 (Haggard et al. 1995:120). 
Their implication is that a more pro-poor policy might not necessarily have rescued 
                                                 
3 This rather harsh judgment is finessed on the following page, however, by the observation that‘the 
most intractable determinant of the likelihood that governments will adjust early is the underlying level 
of inequality in the society… Countries where inequality is high are more likely to reach fundamental 
deadlocks over adjustment.’ (ibid. ,page 121)   4
Bolivia, or any of the other countries listed in Table 1, from the political 
consequences of fiscal austerity.  
In this paper we explore, focusing on the Bolivian case, whether this is still 
true; and, more generally whether the adoption of more ‘politically rational’ reform 
strategies might be capable of achieving more sustainable processes of adjustment 
at lower social cost. Our analytical approach is to visualise developing countries as 
being vulnerable to being caught in a ‘poverty trap’ – an interactive process between 
poverty and its causes -, which if a crisis is wrongly handled may enmesh them in a 
long-term process of decline. ‘Poverty trap’ models have recently re-emerged in the 
development literature as explanations of the persistence of poverty in individuals 
and countries, but they typically do not contain political variables. What is attempted 
here is in general terms to explain the persistence of crisis in terms of the working of 
political institutions as well as economic factors, and in specific terms to ask whether 
and how more pro-poor patterns of policy might in specific cases such as Bolivia’s be 
an effective instrument for escaping from such a crisis.   
 
The original ‘poverty trap’ or vicious circle of poverty’ literature, starting with 
Nurkse (1953), uses a causal mechanism in which, in its simplest form, low income 
causes low investment which perpetuates low income(left-hand part of Figure 2). 
More recent versions of the vicious circle, including Carter and May (1999), World 
Bank(2000) and Barrett and Carter(2006) have added additional mechanisms to this 
vicious circle, of an essentially economic nature
4. Our own argument develops this 
approach by suggesting that what Bolivia has been caught in, since it became 
enmeshed in the global crisis, is a political poverty trap. As in a conventional poverty 
trap model, poverty remained high on account of low and unstable investment rates; 
but what kept investment rates low was in part, a collapse of trust in the political 
process to achieve democratic decision making and an erosion of the institutional 
structure, which in turn was aggravated by economic crisis. Policy choices (at both 
the macro and the micro level) provide a potential escape from this trap, and it will be 
a major objective to investigate the extent to which events in Bolivia were the 
consequence of a failure to take advantage of these opportunities. 
                                                 
4 These include linkages  from poverty to health, participation in labour markets, risk management 
capacity and absence of group insurance mechanisms. For a discussion of recent poverty trap models 
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(a) basic economic (as per Nurkse 1953)                   (b) politico-economic 
 
                                 Figure 2. Varieties of poverty trap  
 
                    
The ‘political poverty trap’ approach specified in (b) forms the core of our general 
explanatory story. In the Bolivian case, two additional country-specific factors - 
relationships with aid donors, and the geographical concentration of wealth, poverty 
and political militancy – play an important part both in setting the initial conditions and 
in determining the course of the drama. These initial conditions are examined in the 
following section 2.   In section 3, we test the poverty trap model pictured in Figure 2 
against the available data for Bolivia. Section 4 takes a comparative perspective and 
asks whether the variables in the poverty trap model help to explain why Bolivia 
experienced a particularly severe political and economic crisis between 2000 and 
2005 in comparison to other countries afflicted by the ‘East Asian’ crisis, and in 
particular whether other countries avoided the crisis by taking up options which were 




2.  The current crisis in its long-term setting 
                 Bolivia’s democratic state, established in 1825, has a notorious record of 
political instability, fragility and reversion to a totalitarian model. During the hundred   6
and sixty years from independence to the hyperinflation of 1985 there were around 
150 changes of government (Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa 2003), and a number of 
episodes of military dictatorship.  Between 1951 and 1985 a whole succession of 
governments sought to break the constraints to the country’s persistently poor 
economic development performance by means of structuralist measures, including a 
thoroughgoing land reform in 1952, nationalisation of the mines in the same year and 
of the country’s natural gas reserves in 1965, and widespread controls on the 
exchange rate and other ‘key prices’. At the onset of the global structural adjustment 
process, in the early 1980s, the government initially resisted pressures for 
expenditure cuts and price decontrol, and the failure of these attempts led eventually 
to one of the great hyperinflations of modern times, reaching its peak at an annual 
rate of 24,000 per cent in August 1985. 
            As might have been expected, the scale of deflation and liberalisation 
required to achieve economic stabilisation was exceptionally painful, and in particular 
involved massive production and employment cuts in the country’s former main 
export staples – the tin and silver mines
5. But gradually, through this process, a 
measure of both political and economic stabilisation was achieved: inflation was 
brought under control, growth in the real economy was positive from 1987 until the 
onset of the global crisis in 2000, and most of the elected governments of this period, 
contrary to all Bolivian precedent, ran their full four-year term. Of these 
administrations, the most radical in its liberalising measures was that of Gonzalo 
Sanchez de Losada, a mining millionaire
6, between 1993 and 1997, which initiated 
(under the so-called ‘Law 21060’) the privatisation of the main public utilities (oil and 
gas, telephones, electricity and water)  under a regime known as ‘capitalisation’. and 
drastically reduced controls on trade and capital movements. It was during this period 
that the Managing Director of the IMF expressed his hope that Bolivia would sustain 
its economic growth, and convert itself into an ‘Andean jaguar’ , by analogy with the 
East Asian ‘tiger economies’
7 . 
  The higher levels of economic growth and political stability produced by this 
liberalisation were however inherently vulnerable, on account of underlying structural 
factors. Firstly  the shift, under structural adjustment, from a growth pattern based on 
exports of minerals to a pattern based on hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) exports 
posed major problems for employment creation and poverty reduction, since mining 
is labour-intensive whereas the oil and natural gas sector is capital-intensive (Table 
2); moreover, within both food and cash-crop agriculture, which is also labour-
intensive, structural adjustment stimulated very little growth
8, making the problem 
worse. Secondly, the gains from structural adjustment, essentially in the tradable oil 
and natural gas sectors, accrued mainly to individuals, mainly not of indigenous 
Aymara and Quechua ethnicity, in the richer east and south-east of the country, 
where the oil and gas deposits are located; and the losses from structural adjustment 
accrued mainly to workers, mainly of indigenous ethnicity, in the poorer west of the 
country. As a consequence, inequality (and especially inter-ethnic and inter-regional 
                                                 
5  Chavez(1992:6) estimates the number of tin miners put out of work at 23,000 out of a workforce of 
30,000 or 70 per cent. and Morales(1991) at 80 per cent. Only about 2,000 tin miners are now (January 
2007) at work. 
6 It is relevant to the subsequent argument that Sanchez de Losada had been a major gainer in the 
privatisation  process in Bolivian mining. He had bought the assets of the few mines which remained 
profitable after the 1985 hyperinflation, and had amalgamated them into a profitable private 
corporation known as CORPOSUR. 
 
7  In a speech in La Paz in June 1996: Lazarte Rojas 2005, p.18. 
8 The one very important exception to this generalisation is the coca industry, which grew fast during 
the period of structural adjustment and is very labour-intensive. De Franco and Godoy (1990) 
calculated by means of a computable general equilibrium model that a 10% increase in cocaine 
production raises Bolivian GDP by 2% and lowers Bolivian unemployment by 6%. Painter(1994) p.56.   7
inequality) grew through the period of stability from 1986 to 2000, and in a way that 
was openly increased by the government’s acts of privatisation. Poverty has been 
measured in Bolivia over a much less lengthy period than inequality; but of the 
available measures of poverty, headcount poverty and poverty measured by access 
to health and education services appear to have diminished over the period prior to 
1999, so that growth over this period can be characterised as (rather weakly) pro-
poor (Klasen et al 2001; Landa and Jimenez 2005). 
 
Table 2. Bolivia 1986-2004: growth of output and employment 
Annual average growth rates 
 
  Whole economy  Agriculture  Mining  Petroleum and gas 


































4.7 -1.7  2.1 nd  0.0 -1.1  5.6 -0.6 
1999-
2004 
2.1  1.0 2.9  2.7  -1.6  0.1 9.5  -0.3 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico 2005, tables 4.02.01.01 and 
3.04.05.01. 
 
The reformist governments of this period were by no means unaware of these long-
term threats to economic and political stability, and attempted by various means to 
palliate them: the throughgoing decentralisation of political power and fiscal 
responsibility to the regions in 1994 (van Cott 2002); the fairly rapid growth of public 
sector employment (Table 2) supported by the pioneering Fondo de Inversion Social 
(Social Investment Fund), which channelled aid  funds into the development of social 
infrastructure for low income groups; and the also fairly rapid growth of small private-
sector and medium enterprises, supported by a number of innovative ventures in 
microfinance (Mosley 2001; Mosley and Marconi 2006), in which Bolivia has a 
reasonable claim to be a global market leader. (The last two of these are effectively 
joint ventures with the aid donors, on whom Bolivia is much more dependent than 
any other Latin American country
10) These tendencies helped to improve the 
appearance of the social indicators, and even allowed some international financial 
agencies, as we saw,  to feel a measure of euphoria about the transformations 
occurring in Bolivia. But the persisting inequality previously referred to, aggravated by 
persisting corruption in the public service, continued to undermine the political 
dividend delivered to the ‘Andean jaguar’ by economic growth . When the global 
recession hit, these areas of long-term weakness were to aggravate the short-term 





3. The crisis of 2000-06, and alternative explanations of its ‘persistence’  
  The ‘East Asian crisis’, having arrived in Latin America via Brazil at the 
beginning of 1999, hit Bolivia later still, in the second half of the year. The next five 
                                                 
9 Fruits, vegetables, grains, dairy and meat products. 
10 Bolivia has a ratio of aid to GNP of nearly 3 per cent (World Bank, World Development Report 
2005, table 21); no other Latin American country has a ratio of more than 1 per cent, and the average 
for the continent as a whole is 0.2 per cent.   8
years were all years of falling per capita GDP , there have been five new presidents 
in the last five years, and lethal political violence has occurred in every year except 
2000, with a climax in 2003 (Table 3). For the moment at least, political stability has 
gone. 
 
    
Table 3. Bolivia: evolution of the economy in relation to elections and  
political violence, 1997-2006   
 
 
  1998 1999 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 2005   
estimate 
Real economy              
Growth 
GNP per capita (in 

















Real GDP growth 
(%): absolute 


























23.8 18.4 17.3  17.0 15.0  12.5     
Foreign 
investment/GNP(%) 
11.9 12.9 10.7  8.7 8.3  4.5     



































  62.3 65.5  64.3  64.6 64.1  63.6  63.1 
Gini coefficient of 
inequality(%) 
62.7 62.2 64.4  61.5  63.2 62.4  61.4  60.1 
Political changes 
and incidence of 
violence 
            
Changes of 
government 




on death of 
Banzer 
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30 (La Paz) 
October: 59  
(La Paz and 
mainly El 
Alto) 
  June: 
1(Sucre) 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (www.ine.gov.bo); Banco Santa Cruz/Muller y Asociados, 
Estadisticas socio-economicas 2001, 2003, 2005. Estimates of headcount poverty from UDAPE .  
‘Deaths in policy-related violence’ and ‘Days lost through strikes and demonstrations’ are our own  
measure, which is elaborated in Mosley(2006b), Appendix 2.  
 
 A brief chronology of these episodes of violence can help to explain the interaction 
between short-term and long-term factors in causing the poverty trap to snap shut. In 
April 2000, blockades in protest at the government’s economic policies were 
organised by the CSUTCB (Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia – the small peasant farmers’ union) in various parts of 
western and central Bolivia, in protest against the increases (of up to 275%) in prices 
imposed by the water authority in Cochabamba, privatised under Law 21060. In the 
process of suppressing these blockades, four people were killed
11 . In February 
2003, a proposal was made to extend the income tax net downwards to include 
various categories of salaried employees not previously covered, in preparation for 
the arrival of an IMF mission which was expected to provide a $3.9 PRGF (Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility) credit in return for credible reductions in Bolivia’s 
fiscal deficit of 8.5 per cent of GDP
12 . Before the proposal could be implemented, it 
was leaked to the press and, when a riot was started by students in the Plaza Murillo, 
the La Paz square where the presidential palace stands, the police, who were 
amongst the low-paid workers at risk of being brought into the income tax net under 
the new proposals, did not defend the palace, and stood aside. The army were then 
sent in to discipline the police, among whom about two-thirds of the 30 fatalities in 
the subsequent rioting took place
13. 
 
The climactic confrontation between the security forces and  civil society took place 
in October 2003. It followed the announcement of a general strike in El Alto and La 
Paz by the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana – Bolivian Confederation of Trade Unions) 
in protest against a government plan to export Bolivian natural gas in an 
unprocessed state through Chile. The army, under government orders, broke a 
blockade of the Senkata petroleum depot, on the south side of El Alto, by force on 13 
October, and this action escalated into a more general insurrection across the whole 
of El Alto in which, on 13 and 14 October, at least 59 people were killed
14. On 14 
October, the vice-president, Carlos Mesa, detached himself from the government in 
the light of the killings, and when, on 17 October, President Sanchez de Losada fled 
the country to escape what had become a lynch mob, Mesa was sworn in as interim 
president. His 21-month administration ended also with a general strike initiated in El 
Alto, in June 2005. The election of the country’s first Aymara-Indian president, Evo 
                                                 
11 These episodes are described in detail in Pulso, issues 37 through 39, 7-27 April 2000. 
12 Miguel Lora, Pulso, 7-13 February 2003, p.11. 
13 Detailed coverage of these incidents is given in Pulso , issue 183, 7-`13 February 2003, and in La 
Prensa for 12 February 2003. 
14  For a very simplified geography of El Alto, see  Figure 3  below. A detailed overview of the events 
of ‘Black October’ is given in the special issue of La Prensa for 23 December 2003. Some eyewitness 
accounts also exist in book form, for example Garcia, Prada and Tapia(2004)   10
Morales, has not ended  the climate of instability: in sectarian rioting between groups 
of miners in Oruro in October 2006, a further fourteen persons were killed, and two 
more died in demonstrations in Cochabamba in January 2007
15 . 
 
Why did these incidents of political violence occur? At the level of proximate causes, 
one account given in the wake of the February 2003 violence by the Governor of the 
Central Bank, Juan Antonio Morales, stressed the long-term factor of inequality 
(especially ‘horizontal’ inter-ethnic inequality), and the failure of the government’s 
short-term measures to relieve it: 
 
[The increases in] Bolivia’s external debt and the external aid aimed at 
reducing poverty benefited mainly the middle class. Even if improvements 
were achieved in the Human Development Index and poverty fell, the 
distribution of income deteriorated, as it did across the whole of Latin 
America. The deterioration of income distribution in a poor and supremely 




 However, several countries also suffering from high levels of inequality, including 
some in Latin America, did not suffer from the same high levels of overt social conflict 
(see further Table 8  below): so one thing that has to be explained is why a given 
plausible cause led to particularly grave effects in Bolivia. Secondly, it is useful to 
embed the Governor’s explanation in a broader picture of cause and effect which 
takes into account not only the causes of violence, but its consequences in terms of 
lowered investment rates, and thence lower productive potential and incomes.  
 
These are captured by the ‘ political vicious circle’ model originally presented in 
Figure 1, which suggests that a circular causation between low incomes, political 
instability, investment collapse and low incomes will persist if the connections from 
economic decline to institutional debility and bypassing of formal political institutions 
(links 2 and 3 on Figure 1) are strong enough. In what follows we shall seek to argue 
that these linkages were particularly strong in Bolivia, and caused the political 
poverty trap to close,  because of four factors: 
(1) ‘deinstitutionalisation’ or ‘political decapitalisation’: because of the 
decay of a range of institutions designed to promote justice and in 
particular to protect the interests of the weak, the deterioration of 
income distribution came to seem particularly hurtful to the 
excluded. 
(2) The metamorphosis of party politics: especially over the years of 
recession (2000-2005) the political parties acknowledged by the 
politically weak as protecting their interests moved away from 
parliamentary towards other channels of influence. 
(3) The geographical focussing of discontent: much of the anger felt by 
the poor was experienced in a location (El Alto) where it could be 
organised and deployed with reasonable probability that violent 
extra-parliamentary action could achieve long-term political change. 
(4)  Wasted opportunities for executing ‘pro-poor’ modes of policy 
reform: even in face of the extreme vulnerability factors represented 
by (1) to (3), economic policy options for healing the underlying 
social conflict existed, had been successfully been tried out in other 
                                                 
15 See Bolivia Rising (http://boliviarising. Blogspot.com/2007/01/democracy-is-people-antonio-
peredo.html), 16 January 2007. 
16 Juan Antonio Morales, ‘Que le ha pasado a Bolivia?’ (What has happened to Bolivia?), Pulso, 14-20 
March 2003, page 7.   11
contexts, and might have been helpfully tried out in Bolivia. They 
were not used, and for this lack of vision the international financial 
institutions, on which Bolivia more than most crisis-afflicted 
countries was heavily dependent, bear some responsibility.  
 
Political instability then drove away foreign capital, and the loss of investment 
perpetuated low income, completing the vicious circle. Having provided a rationale to 





   In various ways, the visible impact of inequality was aggravated by 
institutional decay, or  ‘deinstitutionalisation’  as the phenomenon is generally known 
in Bolivia. One major aspect of this is corruption, and specifically corruption arising 
from the process of ‘capitalisation’ (as the form of privatisation selected in Bolivia was 
known) of state assets, especially oil, gas and minerals. This inflicted an allocational 
problem, due to the fact that factors of production were often not being allocated on 
the basis of efficiency but on the basis of ability to lean on the government; a fiscal 
problem, one illustration of which is that in 2003, the privatised oil and gas 
companies were paying less than half the tax revenue they were paying before 
privatisation
17; and a distributional problem, because the gains from corruption 
accrued mainly to the rich and not to the poor. It was largely the evidence of huge 
gains to the fat cats from the privatisation of the oil and gas sector at a time of 
austerity (and specifically income tax increases) for the mass of the population which 
caused the apparently rather extraneous and rarefied issue of petroleum exports via 
Chile to become a flashpoint in October 2003
18.   
 
A second element of institutional decay, intimately related with the decline in 
investment illustrated by Table 3, is based in the financial sector. The heavily 
microfinance-based
19 recovery of the banking sector gradually became contaminated 
during the boom of the late 1990s, in particular by the entry into the market of 
consumer-credit houses seeking to lend to low-income groups without proper 
appraisal or security (Rhyne, 2002), which loaded many households and small 
businesses with a burden of debt they could not expect to sustain. When the 
recession hit, many clients defaulted on their loans (average six-month arrears rates 
in the microfinance sector rose from 2% to 12% between 1997 and 2001), and some 
of the more politically powerful of them leaned on the Banzer administration of 1999-
2001, sometimes collectively as a debtors’ cartel, to override their creditors and have 
their debts annulled. Some of the more loyal clients of the government were 
                                                 
17 Rolando Morales, La Prensa, 12 February 2003, p.6. ‘The Confederacion de Empresarios Privados 
de Bolivia’, Morales adds, ‘indicated that the fall in the country’s fiscal revenues [between end- 2001 
and end-2002, which had caused a shortfall in revenues and required the IMF to be called in] was 7.3 
per cent, and that the principal reason for that  was a fall of 25.4 per cent over the same period in tax 
revenues due from the hydrocarbons (oil and gas) sector’. 
18 In 2003, this was aggravated by two factors. First, many of the gains from growth, and from growth 
in the oil sector in particular, fell to the advantage of the already rich east and south-east of the country 
rather than the poor west (this has been felt particularly keenly during the period of rising oil and gas 
prices since the onset of the Iraq war in 2003). Second,  President Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, as the 
person who acquired many of the more profitable assets from a collapsing mining industry during the 
structural adjustment period, was himself an early epitome of the class who had made, and exported, a 
great deal of money out of Bolivia as a consequence of the privatisation process.  
 
19 The microfinance institution BancoSol, born out of a non-governmental organisation initially 
capitalised by USAID, was for several years in the mid-nineties the most profitable bank in Bolivia.   12
successful in this, and in this way financial discipline was undermined
20. Because the 
banks were not getting their loans back, their lending, and the level of domestic 
investment, became increasingly constrained: the collapse of domestic investment 
visible in table 3  is intimately related to the collapse of discipline in the banks
21. 
Whereas an initial shock to investment is a common feature of many recessions, 
whether or not this shock turns into collapse depends crucially on the behaviour of 
the banking sector, and it is significant that in Indonesia, another country badly hit by 
the ‘East Asian’ crisis, financial discipline was not relaxed by the main microfinance 
banks and small business investment rose through the recession, acting as a 
counter-cyclical factor (Patten and Rosengard, 2001; Marconi and Mosley, 2006). 
The ability of Bolivia’s financial sector to exit from crisis may depend on whether the 
MAS government carries out its election pledge to cancel all overdue microfinance 
debt , which it so far has failed to do.  
 
A third element of deinstitutionalisation was the erosion of civil rights. An important 
illustration of this process was the refusal of President Sanchez de Losada, in 
September 2003,  to re-elect Ana Maria Romero de Campero as Defensor del 
Pueblo (‘ombudsman’ is only a loose translation). The office had been established in 
1998, as one of the achievements of the Banzer years. A person who had spent five 
years upholding the law, and specifically civil rights law, was removed at a time of 
extreme pressure on those civil rights by the personal edict of the President –against, 
it turns out the advice of many of his senators and MPs
22. The incident was a crucial 
one in triggering the violence of October 2003
23.  
 
During the recession, indeed, the entire legal process in Bolivia became incapable of 
protecting civil or private property rights in a just or equitable manner. In the context 
of a system where, against sins of corruption and tax evasion plated with gold, the 
lance of justice could be seen to break hurtlessly, it was obvious, not only to the 
socially excluded, that existing institutions were not working. This was to be a major 
factor in bringing about political change. 
           
 
The metamorphosis of party politics 
                    It is well acknowledged that across the whole of  Latin America political 
parties have for a number of reasons fallen short of orthodox democratic ideals 
(Foweraker, Landman and Harvey 2003: chapter 5). However, in Bolivia both the 
instability of the party system and the extent to which pro-poor parties have gone 
outside parliament to make their case exceed the Latin American norm. The MNR 
(Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario), the architect of the 1952 land reforms and 
nationalisation programmes, embodied a pro-poor rhetoric for a considerable period, 
but on its return to power in the emergency of the 1985 hyperinflation was forced to 
                                                 
20 This generalisation is true as a general tendency but it is not remotely true for all financial 
institutions. Four microfinance institutions in particular (FIE, Caja los Andes, PROMUJER, and 
CRECER) resisted the trend towards increasing arrears during the recession, in part because their 
management stood up to government pressure to cancel arrears, in part because they were better 
designed to withstand shocks (for example by means of the ‘internal account’ of the last two 
institutions named, which acted as an insurance mechanism), and in part because of intense 
institutional loyalty amongst customers of all these institutions (Marconi and Mosley, 2006).  
21 To the extent that microfinance reduces poverty, the fall in micro-lending described here also 
contributed directly to the increase in poverty of the years 1999-2004. 
22 Interview,     MNR senator, 21 September 2005. 
23 See La Prensa, 23 December 2003, and also the interview with Ana Maria Romero de Campero in 
Pulso, issue 218, 10-16 October 2003, in which she describes Bolivia as a ‘democradura’ (half 
democracy, half dictatorship).   13
put stabilisation before redistribution. Throughout the period of structural adjustment 
between 1986 and 1999, the main parties, all essentially pro-liberalisation, pro-
international capital, pro-US parties of the centre-right (MIR, ADN/NFR, and MNR) 
were forced to engage in coalitions in order to govern, ’constantly changing position, 
like good lovers, each one sometimes on top and sometimes underneath’
24,as 
delightfully described by the columnist and former MP Cayetano Llobet. The horse-
trading involved in making these coalitions compromised not only their ability to make 
rational decisions of fiscal policy
25, but even more their ability to represent in any 
credible way the interests of the socially excluded.  
         As Table 4 illustrates, this merry-go-round has now been completely 
shattered during the five short years of the Bolivian recession. None of the three 
parties which shared power throughout the structural adjustment period fought the 
2005 election as serious candidates, and the country is now governed by a party (the 
MAS, or Movimiento al Socialismo, led by Evo Morales) which until 2002 had only 
3% of the seats in parliament
26. In the 2002 election, the MAS and the MIP 
(Movimiento Indigena Pachacuti, led by Felipe Quispe, also the leader of the 
CSUTCB),  both of them parties led by Aymara Indians committed to social justice 
achieved via constitutional change, economic protectionism and ‘regaining the 
country’s natural resources for the people’, broke through: by contrast with the former 
elite parties, these are both low-tech parties, able to achieve an electoral 
transformation in spite of lacking any national organisation, publicity machine or 
access to international consultants (Lazarte Rojas 2005: 358). The US Ambassador 
clumsily sought to influence the 2002 election by telling the electorate not to vote for 
the MAS, a tactic which spectacularly backfired
27. .From the 2002 election onwards, 
all pretence of respecting the parliamentary rules of the game was abandoned by 
both government and opposition. Quispe, on behalf of the MIP, promised a return to 
the roadblock tactics of 2000
28; Morales sought to supplement or replace the 
parliamentary process with a meeting between the president and a broad front of civil 
society interests: ‘workers, small farmers including coca growers, pensioners, 
financial services clients’
29; and President Sanchez de Losada himself not only 
confined his dialogue with Morales (still the leader of the coca growers’ union) to the 
issue of coca eradication
30, but chose the month of January 2003, just as the 
chances of a peaceful solution to the crisis were beginning to look problematic, to 
launch a pre-emptive strike against the coca growers of the Chapare, in which 





                                                 
24 Llobet 1999, p.47. 
25 For example, the extravagant pensions reform of 2000? – see page 19 below. 
26 The  first serious attempt by a political party contender to represent the interests of the socially 
excluded, in the 1990s, was CONDEPA ( Conciencia de Patria, Conscience of the Nation  ). 
CONDEPA, led by a ‘white’ professional arguing for poverty reduction on grounds of compassion, 
certainly raised the consciousness of the middle class concerning the gravity of social exclusion in 
Bolivia, but fell victim to widespread accusations of corruption (Llobet 1998) and was not able to 
sustain or consolidate its rapid rise. 
27 On 26 June 2003 the US Ambassador, Manuel Rocha, stated: ‘I would like to warn the Bolivian 
electorate that if it chooses candidates who are trying to make Bolivia once again an exporter of 
cocaine, that result would prejudice future aid flows from the United States’ (in the columnUsted Elige, 
in La Prensa for 27 June 2002, as reported by Lazarte Rojas (2005), p.373. 
28 See       Pulso issue 399 (21-27 April 2000) 
29 As  reported in Pulso, 10-16 January 2003, p.4. 
30 See Victor Orduna, Pulso issue 179 (10-16 January 2003) and Lazarte Rojas, p.451.   14
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Sources: Van Cott (2003), table 1,p.753; Lazarte Rojas (2005), appendix. 
 
 
Thus in face of the widening schisms and deprivations aggravated by the global 
crisis, not only did many of the key institutions which might have healed it come apart 
at the seams, but the parliamentary process which might also have healed it was 
partly or wholly bypassed by all of the main contenders. 
              It was the merit of Evo Morales, at the same time as he was contributing to 
this process of bypassing parliament, to persuade not only his core Aymara 
constituency but much of the middle class (at any rate in the western altiplano) to   15
back his efforts within the parliamentary arena
31. He began this process in 2003, we 
argue, by successfully playing a ‘trust game’ against Sanchez de Losada. He 
persuaded not only his core constituency, but large parts of the urban middle class, 
to detach themselves from their traditional loyalties to the elite coalitions, even 
though this meant backing a man described by all the government-supportive media 
as a narcotraficante (drug-dealer). This trust game is formally modelled in the 
Appendix to Mosley(2006). 
 
  Poverty, inequality and militancy 
  It is a cliché frequently repeated in every conversation about the Bolivian 
predicament
32 that ‘poverty lies at the bottom of everything’. True enough, but what 
kind of poverty, or change in poverty, is particularly likely to cause conflict and stop 
stabilisation policy in its tracks? The new economics-of-conflict literature is fairly 
silent on this theme, empirically confirming that lower levels of (and growth in) 
income and food consumption are associated with higher levels of conflict (Auvinen 
and Nafziger 2002, Collier and Hoeffler 2004), but in general confining itself to 
analysis of civil war rather than the type of street conflict discussed here, and not 
differentiating between the many measures of poverty and inequality now available. 
The political science literature stresses that a sudden expected fall in a standard of 
livelihood to which one has become accustomed is the type of poverty impact most 
likely to arouse sudden collective anger, and hence conflict (Gurr 1970, Goodhand 
2003) but has not, in general, involved itself in assessing the role of different 
poverties in determining levels of violence. 
  In relation to Bolivia we may begin by examining what the indicators say and 
where the conflict was located.  The indicators are set out in Table 5. Headcount 
poverty, after probably falling during the boom of the 1990s (Landa 2003, 2005; 
Landa and Jimenez, 2005) rises sharply in 2000, and is then flat through the 
recession to date. Health, education and other social indicators improve 
continuously, including during the recession (Klasen et al. 2005). The INE (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica) estimate of open unemployment, which is only a short 
series, notably rises sharply in 2003, the year of greatest conflict. Other 
unemployment series show much greater variations: the CEDLA (Centro de Analisis 
del Desarollo Agrario y Laboral) urban unemployment series doubles between 2000 
                                                 
31 We carried out a survey in La Paz and El Alto in September 2005  (Mosley 2006) with the purpose 
of understanding the links between interpersonal and political trust. This survey interviewed 105 
people drawn equally from the ranks of microbusiness operators, manual workers and professionals.  
The results suggest that the proportion of professionals intending to vote for Morales was more or less 
equivalent to the proportion of workers and microbusiness owners intending to vote for him: 
 
 
32 This idea is echoed by the Governor of the Central Bank (page 10   above) – who, however, argues 
that inequality, even more than poverty, was the factor which triggered the riots of 2003.   16
and 2003 (table 3), and there are indications that in the city of El Alto, the level of 
unemployment trebled over this period(Table 5 above;La Prensa, special edition 
23.12.04; Pulso, issue 195, 8 May 2003). El Alto, between 1985 and 2003, had 
grown from a small, exposed, dusty shanty-town adjoining the La Paz international 
airport into the Soweto of Bolivia, a vast melting-pot for Aymara and Quechua people 
in many cases uprooted from their previous livelihoods in mining or in agriculture
33, 
on whom the economy of the entire western half of Bolivia depended. 
 
Table 5. Indicators of poverty and ill-being, 1996-2005 
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Source: Unidad de Analisis de Politica Economica (UDAPE); Jimenez and Landa 2004; Klasen et al. 
2005; INE, Anuario Estadistico 2004, table 3.06.03.04, page 339; World Bank 2005, tables 1.1. ‘Normal’ 
headcount poverty line (at 2002 prices) is Bs 233/month (rural) Bs 321/month(urban), Bs 327/month(La 
Paz), Bs 272/month(El Alto). ‘Extreme poverty line’ is Bs 133/month(rural), Bs 170/month(urban), 
Bs181/month(El Alto). CEDLA unemployment data are reproduced in PULSO(La Paz), issue 195, 2-8 
May 2005. 
 
It is, therefore, not possible to say that the onset of renewed social conflict and 
political instability in Bolivia as a whole, in 2000, is correlated with a sharp rise in the 
conventional measure of poverty. Further, the escalation of that conflict, in 2003, is 
not correlated with any visible increase in most of the conventional measures of 
poverty in Bolivia as a whole. What occurred in 2003, rather, was that an increase in  
conflict confined to urban and peri-urban areas on the western side, in the altiplano, 
the main territory of the Aymara, was associated with an increase in unemployment 
                                                 
33 El Alto indeed ‘is unique in Latin America for being an almost wholly indigenous city’, Lazar 2004, 
p.5. 
34 Centro de Estudios para el Desarollo Laboral y Agrario, La Paz 
35 ProMujer estimate. Jan 2004    17
in those same regions – and in particular with an increase in unemployment in El 
Alto, the most politicised part of the country. Even within El Alto (Figure 3b) the 
epicentres of conflict were in  Senkata, Villa Ingenio and Alto Lima -  the parts of the 




As the left-hand part of Figure 3 shows, El Alto, and indeed most of the places where 
political violence has occurred since 2000, is not amongst the localities of highest 
poverty in Bolivia
36, although the contrary is often asserted in the media
37. However, 
it has five characteristics which, we argue, predispose it towards high levels of 
conflict. First, worsening trends both in unemployment, as discussed, but also in 
other indicators of deprivation, notably water and sewerage
38 Second, very high 
levels of intra-personal inequality
39 , including intra-ethnic equality; rising much faster 
than conventional poverty indicators. Third, recent withdrawal of some key services 
needed to support a livelihood; in particular, microfinance was cut back countrywide 
                                                 
36 The highest poverty levels  in Bolivia are in the altiplano south-east of La Paz, between Coroico and 
Potosi (see figure 3 ). According to INE, Annuario Estadistico 2004, table 3.06.03.04, the percentage 
of persons in poverty in El Alto according to the 2001 census was 66.9 per cent (compare 58.9 per cent 
for Bolivia as a whole, or 19.1  per cent for Santa Cruz) 
37 See for example La Prensa, 23 December 2003, p. 22. 
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by most agencies during the recession from 1999 onward (page 12 above; Marconi 
and Mosley 2006) and El Alto is the most microfinance-dependent region in Bolivia. 
Fourth, strategic location: to paralyse western Bolivia and La Paz in particular, all that 
is needed is to blockade El Alto. The country’s main airport is in El Alto (which was its 
original raison d’etre); the three main roads from La Paz to Peru, Argentina and the 
east of the country, and the pipelines by which natural gas is transferred from the 
production areas to La Paz and out of the country, all pass through there. Fifth and 
maybe most crucial, El Alto is emphatically the place in Bolivia where poverty is most 
politicised. The system of juntas vecinales (neighbourhood groups), linked by 
CoJuVe, the Confederation of Neighbourhood Groups
40, made communication easy, 
as did access to modern technology
41: the uprising of October 2003 is one of the first 
revolutions to have been largely organised by mobile phone. It was also of great 
importance to communication that El Alto is made up mainly of recent migrants from 
all parts of Bolivia, and in particular of former miners and peasants.  For the peasant 
confederation the CSUTCB, for the landless peasants’ movement the Movimiento Sin 
Tierra, and for the trade union confederation the COB, El Alto was the main 
organisational focus, reinforcing and seeking to unify the efforts of the juntas 
vecinales
42 and providing them with an idealistic, albeit not fully articulated, policy 
framework. This was autarchic and protectionist in nature, mixing atavistic notions of 
‘returning Bolivia’s natural resources to their rightful owners’  with ideas reminiscent 
of early development economics advocating industrialisation based on those 
resources as a strategy for escaping from Bolivia’s poverty trap. Some of the rhetoric 
emerging from El Alto during the period of the blockade is more reminiscent of late 
nineteenth-century Russia than any place in the twenty-first century: 
 
‘Neighbourhood reunions and workshops took place in which… the possibility of 
making El Alto into a modern industrial city, [ with a freeport,protected by its own tariff 
barrier] with employment for all, was debated. The conclusion of most of these 
discussions was that the only real opportunity of development for the country as a 
whole, and hence for El Alto, was to recapture for the state the asset represented by 
oil and natural gas and to add value to it by means of industrialisation.’
43  
 
                                                 
40 The CoJuVe was partly financed by Evo Morales’ MAS: interview, Katy Lopez, ProMujer El Alto,  
September 2005. 
41 Interview, Fernando Romero, 16 September 2005. 
42 The rebellions of 2003 and 2005 not only set workers against business owners, but also 
neighbourhoods against neighbourhoods, and women against men. (Mostly female) street-traders, 
receiving microfinance loans and needing to break the blockade to get their inputs and sell their 
produce,  were in may cases the partners of (mostly male) workers required by the COB or the junta 
vecinal to be on the blockade. The juntas vecinales operated a licensing system, requiring traders to 
hold permits (fichas) if they were to continue to trade; many traders, during the blockade, were 
threatened with the withdrawal of these permits and even with the destruction of their kiosks unless 
they took part in the blockade (interviews,  February 2004; see also Aliaga and Mosley 2006) 
43 Unsigned article, ‘Pedagogia de la Sangre: Las Lecciones de Octubre ( What we learn from 
Bloodshed: The lessons of October 2003), La Prensa (La Paz), 23 December 2003, p. 20. During 2003 
several articles were published in the Bolivian press illustrating how Bolivia’s oil and natural gas 
resources could be converted into petrochemicals, plastics and other derivatives far more labour-
intensive than existing oil and gas extraction activities, See for example El Diario, 5 February 2003, 
where it is claimed that value added from natural gas exports could be multiplied between a factor of 
between two and ten depending on whether the processing is ‘simple’ (electricity generation) or 
‘compound’ (second and third generation petrochemical products). In particular, opportunities existed 
for selling gas-generated electricity to Brazil and Argentina from power stations located near the 
eastern and southern borders: an agreement of this with Argentina was signed to great acclaim in June 
2006.  
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El Alto’s high degree of political vision and organisation was thus, during this period, 
blended with its ability to serve as a conduit for most of the grievances of the poorest. 
This unique role greatly augmented the probability of those grievances turning into 
violence.  
 
The choice of adjustment instrument and the role of aid donors 
All of these three factors – the rise of radical ethnically-based political parties, 
deinstitutionalisation, and the politicisation of urban poverty in El Alto – form the 
frame determining the government’s room for economic-policy manoeuvre. It is to the 
use that was made of that room for manoeuvre that we finally turn.  
 
The context is that under the stress of recession, fiscal leakage through corruption
44 
and a series of misconceived public-expenditure decisions, the Sanchez de Losada 
government found itself at the beginning of 2003 (Table 1)  with an unsustainable 
public sector deficit of 8.5% of GDP, of which five percentage points were caused by 
a a public-sector pensions reform  expected to cost an extra 1.1 billion bolivianos 
($150 million) over the years 2000-2010(La Prensa, 12/2/03; Julio Loayza, personal 
communication),. Needing to close this fiscal gap, it took two decisions both of which 
were the trigger for conflict, and which, we argue, caused the political poverty trap to 
finally snap shut. In February, it proposed an extension of the income-tax net to 
certain categories of the lower middle class, including the police (whose rebellion 
was suppressed in the February riots), and in September, as part of an overall plan 
for economic expansion, it proposed that exports of natural gas should be expanded 
by means of a new pipeline through Chile. In part because of the political turmoil 
which they caused, these decisions were economically and even fiscally counter-
productive. Why were they taken?  
                                                 
44 Recall the argument on page 16  above.    20
 
Table 6. Fiscal-policy decisions of 2003 resulting in violence, and the 
alternatives to them 
 
  Income tax reforms, February 
2003 
Natural gas exports, September 
2003 
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The most obvious answer is a failure of vision: to foresee either that the measures 
proposed would force the government into conflict, or that alternatives existed which 
could have achieved the same fiscal saving at lower cost. We examine the two cases 
in sequence. 
 
In the case of the February 2003 income tax increase, it seems clear that although 
the idea of closing the fiscal gap in this way originated with the IMF, the Fund left it   21
open for the government to propose other alternatives
45. Any politically aware 
government would have known, firstly, that a  tax increase widely perceived as 
regressive
46 whose principal focus was the urban middle class was dangerous. 
(Once of the most important findings of the OECD study of social consequences of 
adjustment by Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992) was that, of all possible techniques 
for adjusting to a fiscal deficit, tax increases had the highest social costs). The 
analysis of Table 6 suggests that other tax bases existed which could have been 
immediately tapped in the short term both with less regressive, and with less harsh 
political, consequences. Secondly, it would have been both quicker and less 
regressive to seek to close the deficit by making cuts on the expenditure side 
(especially capital spending) than by increasing taxes of any kind. In the event not 
only was this not done, but public spending was increased through the crisis period, 
with four new ministries and nine new vice-ministries created between June 2002 
and February 2003
47. In the longer term, the obvious way of lowering the political 
costs of adjustment would have been to redirect the pattern of public expenditure in a 
more pro-poor direction. Alternatively, by other means, it might have been possible to 
increase what we describe as the social efficiency wage – the bundle of public 
policies which have leverage in forestalling political instability, and which thereby 
raise the productivity of all public expenditure, by analogy with the efficiency-wage 
concept of standard labour economics, where an increase in the private wage 
increases the stability and productivity of labour (Mosley 2004,  Mosley and 
Mussurov 2007)
48. But none of these options were taken. De-institutionalisation had 
helped to close the channels through which they could be communicated to the 
government.  
 
The trigger for the second and more serious wave of political violence, in October 
2003, - the government’s announcement that it intended to build an oil and gas 
pipeline through Chile – is in a sense more surprising, because unlike the February 
tax increase it did not impinge directly on the entitlements of any social group. The 
context is however that the policy of capitalising (privatising) the hydrocarbons 
sector, and indeed all the state-owned industries
49, had left a legacy of bitterness for 
reasons already discussed: namely that it yielded a small return to Bolivia because of 
its ownership by international capital (made smaller still because many of the 
                                                 
45 This is asserted by (inter al) Juan Antonio Morales, Governor of the Central Bank of Bolivia, 
PULSO,   14-21  March 2003, page 7  .  The IMF Resident Representative in La Paz confirmed that 
what the Fund had foreseen was ‘not to extend the income tax net to politically sensitive groups such as 
the lower middle class…but simply to extend the net of income taxpayers beyond the 10% who were at 
that time paying income tax’ Interview, Esteban Vesperoni, La Paz, 15 November 2006 . 
46  In essence, the reform proposed that some income tax should be paid not just by the richest 20% of 
the population but also by the next four deciles (going from the richest 30% to the richest 60%). 
Schedules with different distributions of this extended tax burden were published in the press (e.g. 
Miguel Lora, ‘Golpe a la classe media’ (Blow to the middle classes) PULSO, issue 183(7-13 February 
2003), page 11; La Prensa, 12 February 2003, page 4). Whether or not this would have been regressive 
(ie increased inequality and/or poverty ) depends on the distribution of public expenditure, which some 
commentaries argue was in fact pro-poor between 2000 and 2005 (   ); what is important however was 
the proposed tax changes were perceived as hitting the middle-class and in particular the lower middle-
class such as the rank and file police much harder than the rich, many of whom were not paying the tax 
they owed anyway. (Morales op.cit note 43; Julio Loayza, personal communication).  
47 La Prensa, 12 February 2003, p.6. 
48 For further discussion of the social efficiency wage concept see Mosley (2004, 2007) 
49  The Cochabamba ‘water war’ of April 2000, which initated the current wave of political instability, 
can be analysed in the same way, namely as a protest against the augmentation of inequality by a 
privatised utility. In Cochabamba that April, the price of water was tripled and people saw themselves 
as having to choose between food and water (Mc Neish 2005).   22
corporations were not paying their taxes)
50, and in particular conferred few benefits 
on the poor western side of the country. The bitterness was increased because 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada had personally become a millionaire out of the 
privatisation of the country’s mining industry; and because of an ancestral grievance, 
going back to 1879, against Chile
51, through which the proposed pipeline was to go. 
In the still recessionary climate of mid-2003 the government urgently needed to 
increase export and fiscal revenues,and again failed to perceive how politically 
inflammatory was the route by which it was seeking to do this
52. The riots of October 
2003 can therefore be seen as a protest against inequality augmented by what the 
radical opposition described as entreguismo (‘handoverism’)
53 ; which again, by an 
argument similar to that used in the case of income tax above, did not represent the 
only alternative open to the government, but could have been accompanied by less 
regressive measures: windfall taxes on the privatised hydrocarbon industries, 
democratisation of decision-taking over the ownership of those industries, measures 
to add value to the production of unprocessed natural gas, and in the longer term, 
once again, measures to increase the social efficiency wage. The first two of these, 
indeed, were implemented by the Mesa regime of 2004-5, and the third and fourth 
were promised in the manifesto of the new Morales government (Government of 




 It might have been hoped that the donors –  or at any rate some or all of  the ‘gang 
of four’ who deal with all the budgetary support and macro-policy advice given to 
Bolivia
55  - would warn the Sanchez de Losada government of the danger associated 
                                                 
50 Recall page    above. 
51 In the war of 1879 Chile deprived Bolivia of its coastal territories and acquired control over its 
access to the Pacific ports. 
52
53 In our survey of September 2005 (see note 30) we asked respondents for their views concerning the 
causes of the fall of Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada. The replies were distributed as follows: 
Answer given to 
the question’What 
were the reasons 








Wanted to sell gas 
to Chile 
11 12  2  25 
Use of violence  5  9  2  16 





3 1  4  8 
Mismanagement of 
the economy 
 2  6  8 
Took the side of 
the US/’not a true 
Bolivian’ 
1 4    5 
Injustice, ‘hatred 
of the poor’ 
 2  3  5 
Across the sample as a whole, therefore, the gas issue dominated even the use of violence as a cause of 
the President’s downfall, even though it did not directly affect the well-being of any of them. 
54  
55 The IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Corporacion Andina de 
Fomento.   23
with its chosen instrument of fiscal adjustment. They did not. Indeed, the president of 
one of them appeared on national television to defend the need for a downward 
extension of the income tax network on February 11, the night before first the police 
and then the whole of La Paz rioted against the injustice (Lazarte Rojas 2005:18). 
The World Bank’s representative very uncharacteristically claimed that it did not see 
fiscal policy and other short-term policy issues as a Bank, much more a Fund, 
responsibility
56, and the Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF) argued that it saw its 
role at the time as to achieve implementation of expenditure projects on which money 
was unspent and development thereby delayed
57, not tax reform. The degree of 
coordination between the donors, and between them and the Sanchez de Losada 
government of whose decentralising, open-economy policies they greatly approved, 
was exemplary. This was the problem. The difficulty was not that the donors (as so 
often) were not singing from the same hymn-sheet, but that they were. Had but one 
of them warned the emperor that he was about to have his clothes forcibly removed, 
it is possible that some of the forces tending to close the poverty trap shut might at 





Modelling of the political poverty trap 
The argument is, then, that the four factors analysed – deinstitutionalisation, the 
changing modus operandi of the party system, the El Alto factor, and the 
government’s abuse of its room for manoeuvre – converted an external shock into a 
political poverty trap. We now seek to gain more insight into this process by 
modelling it . A flow diagram of the model to be estimated is presented in  Figure 4, 
which is transcribed directly from the right-hand part of Figure 1: 
                                                 
56 Interview, Carlos Mollinedo, World Bank La Paz, 14 September 2005. 
57 Interview, Oscar Bonifaz Paz, CAF, La Paz, 22 September 2005. 
58 The CAF, somewhat locking the stable door after the horse has bolted, is currently disbursing a 
Prestamo de Distension Social (Loan for Reducing Social Tensions). The concept is laudable, and 
consists essentially of Emergency Social Fund-type expenditure focussed on areas of political tension 
such as those in Figure 3.  
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The results of estimating this simultaneous-equation system are presented in table 7. 
The rationale behind the specification is as follows: 
 
 
Political violence (relationship (1). Much analytical effort has recently been put in 
estimating predictive models of conflict in developing countries: but mainly with an 
emphasis on civil war. Within this literature, there is much debate between so-called  
‘greed’ models (eg Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004), in which conflict arises from the 
rebellion of individuals on economically rational grounds against the established 
state, and ‘grievance’ models (for example Cramer 2002 and Fearon 2004) in which 
conflict typically arises from the expression of resentment against so-called 
‘horizontal’ inequalities (for example, between ethnic, religious, or regional groups) in 
an extreme form.   
 
Our own interpretation, in which political violence in Bolivia arose from inequality 
(both horizontal and vertical) aggravated by institutional decay, the organisation of El 
Alto and poor policy, clearly contains elements of both these explanations. The rapid 
rise of unemployment in El Alto in 2002-3, and the blockage of constitutional   25
channels of protest, clearly aggravated the desperation and hopelessness of many 
inhabitants and, in the language of the ‘greed’ approach, lowered the costs of protest, 
especially a protest whose costs, as in the case of this type of violence , fell well 
short of civil war. At the same time, the level of injustice and distrust of government 
felt by the Aymara/Quechua population (and increasingly the middle class), and the 
increasing level of political mobilisation of that population, particularly in El Alto, are 
causes of conflict more associated with ‘grievance’ type explanations. All of these 
variables feature in our estimating equation, with trust represented by the monthly 
index of ‘confidence in government policy’ collected by the opinion poll agency Apoyo 
and political mobilisation represented by the popularity ranking of parties committed 
to extra-parliamentary action (the MAS and MIP). One merit of our dataset, in 
principle, is that we have data on actual political violence, in the sense of deaths in 
conflict associated with stabilisation policies (roadblocks, demonstrations etc.) rather 
than the ‘political instability’ indicators typically used in research of this type (e.g. the 
ICRG and World Bank datasets), which rely on the subjective opinons of key 
informants reported to public opinion surveys . However, both the violence and the 
political popularity data are only available for a period of eleven years (44 quarters), 
from 1996 through 2006, and it is important to be aware of the interpretive limitations 
imposed by this constraint. For this reason, our ‘political violence’ story is presented 
in the context of other types of evidence, both qualitative and quantitative. 
 
 
 Confidence in government (relationship (2)).A long-established literature on political 
support functions in industrialised countries argues that confidence in government, 
and hence confidence in it, will be responsive to variations in the electoral cycle, and 
also to variations in perceived competence in economic management
59. In the 
literature on industrialised countries,  measures of material well-being (e.g. the 
national rates of unemployment, of inflation and sometimes of personal consumption 
per capita) are typically used as measures of economic competence. In the context 
of Bolivia, as we have seen, not only measures of absolute material prosperity but 
also measures of process (notably the level of political violence) and measures of 
perceived social justice and inequality between different social and ethnic groups 
have been influential in determining levels of trust in the government. Hence, in our 
estimation of support for the government ( linkage (2)) for Bolivia, we retain, from the 
standard literature on voting functions, ‘time since last election’, unemployment and 
change in personal consumption and add in our estimator of political violence 
(quarterly deaths in street riots and demonstrations) into the regression set.   
 
Violence, investment and poverty (relationships (3) and (4)). The final links in this 
part of the poverty trap are those between political instability and investment. We 
surmise that  political instability will depress both domestic and, especially, foreign 
investment (as in the analysis of Alesina and Perotti(1996), and that this lower 
investment, completing the ‘vicious circle’, will lead in subsequent periods to higher 
poverty.  
 
Our poverty trap model is one of simultaneous causation, in which the causes of 
political violence are themselves endogenous to indicators of poverty and other 
causal variables within the model; hence a simultaneous-equation estimation 
technique, three- stage least squares(3SLS) is employed, in which the right-hand 
variables which are endogenous are replaced by appropriate exogenous, or 
instrumental, variables  which are correlated with the endogenous right-hand side 
                                                 
59 A large literature seeks to estimate ‘popularity functions’, using opinion-poll data on the 
government’s popularity as a dependent variable. See Kramer(1970) Goodhart and Bhansali(1971) and 
Mosley(1978). We believe this is one of the first attempts to estimate them for a developing country.   26





Table 7: Regression analysis of ‘political poverty trap’ model 
  
Regression coefficients on independent variables: 










Gini coefficient of 
inequality 
(linkage 4) 
Period  Pre- and  
Post-crisis   Crisis 
1996-2006 2000-06 
 
Pre- and  
Post-crisis   Crisis 
1996-2006  2000-06 
 
Pre- and  
Post-crisis   Crisis 
1996-2007 2000-06 
 
Pre- and  
Post-crisis   Crisis 
1996-2008 2000-06 
 
Constant  226.3**   -403.5** 
(3.54)         (7.71) 
71.3**          524.3** 
(10.64)        (7.62) 
107.0*         11.7** 
(2.61)           (28.2) 
60.5**       53.3** 
(9.34)      (3.02) 








-5.31**       -86.8** 
(4.00)         (6.94) 
  
Unemployment (CEDLA 
data), urban areas only 
                 0.53 
                   (0.50) 
                    0.92** 
               (3.69) 
Gini coefficient of 
inequality 
4.62*        6.43** 
(1.96)       (4.58) 
    
Confidence in 
government 
-6.19**         -0.11 
(3.65)           (0.41) 
                       0.045** 




1.42*           0.15* 
(2.22)        (4.38)     
                     
  -0.34** 
(3.09) 
 
Political violence indicator                   -1.76** 
                   (4.89) 
-0.82*           -0.002 
(2.38)            (0.38) 
 
Investment rate        -0.28**       -1.83* 
(2.49)         (2.84) 
Pro-poor expenditure       -0.33**     -1.92*     
(4.98)        (1.38) 
Poverty (headcount 
index) 




Number of observations  44                28  44            28  44             28 
R
2 0.91             0.95  0.59         0.86 
44               28 
0.68           0.79  0.55          0.81 
Note: Three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation; data are quarterly for the duration of the recession 
from first quarter 1999 to final quarter 2005 (hence n=40).  Instrumental variables are in italics. 
Definitions and sources: Political violence indicator: Deaths in policy-related conflict (street violence and 
demonstrations): index constructed from original sources, see Table 3  above. Headcount poverty, Gini 
coefficient of inequality, INE unemployment rate  total investment rate, foreign investment rate: from 
Instituto  Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Estadisticas socio-economicas 2004. CEDLA unemployment 
rate: from Centro de Estudios para el Desarollo Laboral y Agrario, La Paz.Trust in government: Apoyo 
Opinion y Mercado, Informe de Opinion, August 2005 issue plus updates. Political militancy indicator: 




The results of the regressions confirm as significant all the links hypothesised as 
make up the ‘political vicious circle’ model of Figure 3. Political violence (linkage 1) is 
associated with, amongst economic (‘greed’) variables, high levels of the Gini 
coefficient of inequality(reflecting the correctness of the instincts of the Governor of 
the Central Bank, page 10  above),  but, as discussed in the text above, it responds 
insignificantly to conventional poverty measures (Figure 5): violence has increased, 
between the late 90s and early 2000s, whilst poverty has slightly fallen. Amongst the 
political ‘grievance’ variables in our model, violence is negatively associated with the   27
Apoyo index of trust in government and positively associated with a rise in the share 
of militant parties . As also illustrated on Figure 5, trust in government  (linkage 2) 
rebounds at the beginning of each electoral period and responds negatively to levels 
of unemployment (as in industrial countries) but also responds negatively to political 
violence.  Investment (and in particular inward investment from abroad; linkage 3) are 
responsive to the violence indicator and the political militancy indicator, declining 
particularly sharply during periods such as 2000 and 2003 when political instability is 
high and improving when calm is restored, in keeping with the cross-section findings 
of Alesina and Perotti (1996). Finally, and completing the political vicious circle, the 
Gini coefficient of inequality (linkage 4) responds negatively in response to declines 
in foreign investment and to increases in poverty and the social efficiency wage 
(ppe)
60. The results are robust to changes in specification, for example the 
experimental changes in estimating sample and control variables reported in the 
right-hand part of each column of table 7. When we move from data for the pre-and 
crisis period to the crisis period only, and when we amend the set of instrumental 
variables used to estimate the parameters of the poverty trap, the estimated impact  
of the core variables in the model does not significantly alter: the key linkages 
continue to be those from investment and the composition of public expenditure, to 
inequality, to political violence, to confidence in government, and back to investment. 
 
  
                                                 
60 The ‘social efficiency wage’ is the set of public expenditures visualised as influencing political 
stability, and its definition is therefore sensitive both to the distribution of well-being and  to the 
relative militancy of different social groups in each country. As a proxy for the social efficiency wage 
we here use ‘pro-poor expenditure’ (ppe), the ratio of expenditure likely to benefit low-income groups 
(primary health and education, rural water and sanitation, agricultural research and extension) as a 
proportion of total government expenditure. It is by no means clear how robust this definition of the 
social efficiency wage, which suggests that pro-poor expenditure will increase political stability, is 
across countries (Mosley and Mussurov, 2007). However, on the evidence of the right-hand column of 
table 7, it seems to work reasonably well in Bolivia.   28
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4.International comparisons revisited 
 
In order to better understand the question of how Bolivia came to be caught in a 
political poverty trap, we now take up again the comparison with other crisis-afflicted 
countries. In Table 8, we compare the values of the key policy and institutional 
variables which determined the likelihood of exit from crisis – institutional capacity, 
inequality, and a variety of indicators of the progressivity of economic policy – as 
between Bolivia and the other crisis –affected countries considered in Table 1, for the 
period 1995-2002, spanning the period from the build-up to the global crisis to the 
point when most of the crisis-afflicted countries were beginning to work out an exit 
strategy from it.  
 
    
 
Table 8. Crisis countries: vulnerability indicators 
Data given are for 1995-2002 (ie an average of pre-crisis and post-crisis years), 
unless otherwise stated.  
  Initial conditions:  Policy choices: (as per table 7) 










































































Malaysia  44.0 -0.13  56.7  12.5  6.1  12.0 
Thailand  42.2 0.37 40.4  12.0  6.9  12.5 
Turkey  39.2 -0.54  -23.3  24.2  13.6  9.6 
Russia  40.5 -0.34  37.7  9.6  4.6  12.1 
Brazil  58.7 0.52 134.2  9.0  8.5  13.1 
Argentina  58.0 0.57 160.0  8.9  12.2  7.8 
Bolivia  60.0  0.27 -10.3  10.6  7.9  3.6 
  
Sources: 
Gini coefficient of inequality: from World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-ROM. 
World Bank institutional capacity indicator: from World Bank website, www. 
worldbank.org./wbi/governance/govdata2002/(for a gloss, see also Kaufmann et al. (2003)). 
Internal/external adjustment measure: ratio of changes in real exchange rate to tax rates; 
original source for both is IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Pro-poor expenditure (PPE) index and ratio of health and education spending to GDP: IMF 
Government Expenditure Statistics Yearbook (for more detail of methods of calculation of the 
PPE index, see Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004)) 
Capital controls(IMF score): original source is IMF, Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various issues. (summary data are provided in 
Duasa and Mosley 2006, table A1, page 1224.)    
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 In terms of factors predisposing towards political vulnerability, Bolivia had higher 
levels of the Gini coefficient of inequality
61 than all countries except Brazil (column 1 
of the table), compounded by severe horizontal inequalities both in income and in 
access to civil rights between ethnic groups: this, we recall, was the Central Bank 
Governor’s diagnosis of the root cause of the riots of February 2003). In terms of 
policy options which may be considered as potential exit routes from the poverty trap, 
we consider three: 
(1) The balance between external and internal crisis-recoverty options. As 
demonstrated by the original OECD study of adjustment (Bourguignon and 
Morrisson 1992) different adjustment instruments have different social costs. 
In particular, they argue, external measures of adjustment (and in particular 
exchange-rate devaluation) tend to have relatively lower social, and 
consequent political, costs because, providing the elasticity of response is 
sufficient, many poor people in export-related activities typically gain from 
devaluation, whereas  internal measures of adjustment such as monetary 
deflation, expenditure cuts and tax increases lead to no gains for the poor at 
all (tax increases, as we saw in Bolivia, tend to be  particularly inflammatory). 
We test this proposition  by comparing the trend in the real exchange rate – 
which may be used as an index of external competitiveness – across the 
sample of countries in our Table 1. 
(2) The government’s willingness to insulate the economy against the volatility of 
capital movements, in the shape of capital controls. As discussed above, a 
persistent element in the radical critique of the Sanchez de Losada 
government was that its liberal policies left Bolivia too exposed to the slings 
and arrows of fortune on international capital markets, and it is relevant to 
examine whether other crisis-affected countries sought to gain control over 
capital inflows and outflows. 
(3) The functional allocation of public expenditure: the extent to which public 
expenditure was concentrated on social groups likely to be politically militant, 
or ‘social efficiency wage’. We consider two indicators of the social efficiency 
wage: the share of public expenditure spent on health and education and the 
‘pro-poor expenditure index’
62, or share of expenditure spent on lower income 
groups.  
 
The data of table 8, although fallible, suggest that Bolivia failed to make proper use of 
potential escape routes from the poverty trap which were utilised by other 
governments of crisis countries. It allowed its real exchange rate (column 3 of the 
table) to appreciate more than any other country in the sample except Turkey (other 
crisis-affected countries, notably in East Asia, intensified their policy of aggressive 
devaluations of the exchange rate, thereby making possible substantial gains for low-
income groups working in labour-intensive export-competitive activities, notably 
manufacturing). Uniquely within the sample and indeed within the southern cone of 
Latin America as a whole, it did not ever (not even now during the socialist Morales 
regime) impose controls on either the inflow or the outflow of capital (column 6 of the 
table), which in Chile, Argentina and Malaysia were able to play an important role in 
protecting against the loss of jobs and in giving the electorate the impression that the 
government was in control of, rather than dominated by, international capital flows 
(Duasa and Mosley 2006, Woods 2006). Third, however, on some indicators and in 
particular health and education, Bolivia was on an improving trend even in relation to 
                                                 
 
62 Measured as the share of expenditure in the following categories: primary health and education, 
agricultural research and extension, and rural water and sanitation, as percentages of GDP. See 
appendix to Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor(2004).   31
other countries,
63 which may be one reason why the donors, much of whose aid was 
concentrated in these areas, were somewhat taken by surprise by the events of 
2003. Thus some important elements of the ‘social efficiency wage’ had indeed been 
improved across Bolivia as a whole, and explicitly in areas of high ethnic majority 
concentration. What however had not been done was to satisfactorily improve the 
social efficiency wage in El Alto, the focus of discontent. One aggravating factor was 
that the measures which in Bolivia in the 1990s were very successful at 
counteracting this rising poverty, notably microfinance, were by contrast with other 
countries which were affected by the global crisis (and notably Indonesia) cut back 
between 1999 and 2002 (Marconi and Mosley, 2005)
64. A second, still more severe, 
was that support from international financial agencies, who had much to lose 
geopolitically and financially from any persistence of crisis  in large economies such 
as Russia, Turkey, Argentina and Brazil, was much less forthcoming in the case of 
little Bolivia. The first group of economies were bailed out with as much as was 
necessary to prevent the economy falling into a downward spiral; this approach was, 
as was, as we have seen, not thought to be needed in Bolivia, where in addition 
there is no record that any of the donors thought it necessary to give any warnings 







                          Bolivia’s return to economic and political instability since 2000 has 
been taken by many, particularly in Bolivia, as a historically foregone conclusion, with 
some commentators taking the argument back to 1879 (Molina 2005) and arguing 
that the country’s predisposition to mass action and to rent-seeking is a ‘fixed effect’ 
which makes instability inevitable, and keeps the poverty trap closed. 
                         Our argument here has been that this determinism is overdone.  We 
have seen that the initial conditions within which Bolivia was operating during the 
structural adjustment process of the 1990s – in terms of high overall and specifically 
inter-ethnic inequalities, aggravated by the country-specific ethnic and geographical 
concentration of political militancy- did not constitute a good hand of cards with which 
to be confronting the renewed economic crisis of the early 2000s. We have also seen 
how the characteristic variables of our ‘political poverty trap’ - institutional decay and 
the decaying legitimacy of the elite-based party system – augmented the vulnerability 
of the Sanchez de Losada government as it confronted that crisis. Each of these 
factors have also been important in the persistence of other economic crises, notably 
Argentina, Turkey and Indonesia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But a number of 
elements in this process of hysteresis have been Bolivia-specific, notably the 
politicisation of one highly unusual city and the  government’s narrow field of vision at 
the moment of extreme crisis in 2003: in terms of who it negotiated with, what 
measures it used to keep the fiscal deficit under control, what economic policy 
instruments it used to keep the medicine of stabilisation palatable, and what 
instruments of communication it used to expose the gains and defend the losses it 
was inflicting through all these policies . In all of this myopia it was, we have argued, 
encouraged by rather than forewarned by its high level of dependence on, and the 
poor advice it received from, aid donors. Thus Bolivia’s escape from the poverty trap, 
                                                 
63 Klasen et al. 2005, page 35 . 
64 This trend was not universal: some institutions, especially the village-banking NGOs, always resisted 
the recession. Now (September 2005) the trend is fairly universally upward, and the microfinance 
sector is growing at 25% per annum (interview, Fernando Romero, 16 September 2005) 
65 Contrast other countries where donors have been able to supply effective warnings (Indonesia?, also 
relevant Ethiopia and Tanzania. See Mosley and Suleiman 2005)   32
over the period we are examining, was admittedly hindered, but not precluded, by 
adverse initial conditions; what was really lacking was ingenuity and vision in the 
design of policy and institutions. We have illustrated this proposition mainly by 
relation to the cases of tax policy and petroleum sector policy during the climatic year 
of 2003, but many less political salient cases (pensions policy, public expenditure 
allocation, capital controls), only superficially analysed here, all helped to narrow the 
channel down which the government could hope to navigate. Five times between 
2000 and 2005 that channel became blocked completely, producing each time a 
deterioration in the ‘permanent’ level of public trust in the government  and a further 
twist in the vicious spiral of poverty. Since 1999, the level of per capita real GDP in 
Bolivia has declined by 15  per cent, even though the country is currently in the 
middle of an oil and gas boom, and 2006 is the first year of the decade in which an 
increase in per capita GDP has been registered.  
 
               What are the main options for escape from the poverty trap? As the model  
of Figure 3 illustrates, the crux remains to find means of influencing the key 
intermediate variables of investment and employment; and all that our model does is 
to throw emphasis on to political and institutional channels of influencing them. Some 
commentators, including the present Morales government in Bolivia, have seen the 
solution primarily in terms of a shift to new ‘post-Washington consensus’ policy 
instruments. ‘This [sc. October 2003] was the moment’, declared one MAS member 
of parliament to La Prensa on 23 December 2003, ‘when the neo-liberal economic 
model in Latin America wore itself out’
66, and there is considerable awareness in the 
new government’s policy manifesto that measures which increase perceived 
distributional fairness across a broad base can have powerful impacts on public trust 
and thence on investment, the structure of demand
67 and employment, for example 
hydrocarbon sector-based industrialisation (Government of Bolivia 2006 , page 11, 
17-18 and 27)  and capital controls, especially if they are designed so as to avoid 
disincentive effects on efficiency, as in Malaysia and Chile (Duasa and Mosley, 
2006).  Other commentators, again including the Morales government (Bolivia 2006 ) 
have seen the solution in terms of reinstitutionalisation, in particular through an 
Asemblea Constituyente, and here as we have seen there are many parallels with 
the approach of the Kirchner government in Argentina. Finally, communication 
channels are important, as much for aid donors (who at the crucial moment, did not 
transmit the crucial and needed disaster warnings to the Sanchez de Losada 
government) as for Bolivian governments themselves - who at the crucial moment, in 
both 2003  and 2005, failed to perceive the erosion in middle-class trust and acted so 
as to further deplete rather than build up that trust. The structure of these channels, 
together with the breadth of the government’s field of policy vision and the incentives 
provided by its institutions, appears from the Bolivian experience to have an 
important bearing on whether the process of recovery from crisis is self-reinforcing or 
self-defeating. 
  What hope is there that the ‘neo-developmentalist’ (neodesarrollista)
68 
Morales government, which has been implementing an alternative strategy for 
escape from the poverty trap for the whole of 2006 to date, can finally reverse the 
spiral?  We can seek the beginnings of an answer by referring back to the four 
political factors which, on our earlier analysis, kept the poverty trap closed. On two of 
                                                 
66 On the economic impact of globalisation and liberalisation see Simmons and Elkins(2004) and on its 
diverse political impact in Latin America see Kurtz(2003) 
67 In its emphasis on the link between income distribution and the structure of demand the MAS 
manifesto recalls one of the key modern arguments in favour of a ‘big push’ – type programme of 
balanced industrial development (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989)  
68 For a discussion of neo-developmentalism under the Kirchner administration in Argentina see Grugel 
and Riggirozzi(2007)   33
them the answer can be reasonably positive: the old party system, and apparently 
much of the corruption which went with it, has gone, and the ‘El Alto factor’, which 
brought Morales to power, has continued to work to his advantage within his 
presidency: the level of political violence has certainly declined since 2003, by any 
index, although the Sucre hunger strikes in August to try and force increases in 
public expenditure
69, and much more severely, the Huanuni miners’ riot in October
70 
were a major blow to the new government’s hopes of pacifying the south-western 
region. However on the two other factors, deinstitutionalisation and the choice of 
economic policy, the verdict has to be more tentative. As might have been expected, 
the man who, out of office, once described capitalism as ‘the worst enemy of 
humanity’
71 has not acted in office so as to destroy it, and some of the ways in which 
this has been manifested (for example, his failure to implement a threatened 
moratorium on microfinance debt) have definitely been positive for institutional 
development, and the Central Bank has been allowed to continue to practise 
conservative management of the money supply
72. But the main reinstitutionalisation 
project, the work of the proposed Constituent Assembly to reform the constitution, 
has scarcely begun, and no verdict on the impact of new institutional development on 
long-term poverty trends is yet possible. Similarly, the impact of the new economic 
policy environment brought in by Morales is not yet clear. The renationalisation of the 
private oil and gas sector on 1 May 2006 appears not to have provoked, at any rate 
by the time of writing, the flight of private capital
73 that was feared by right-wing 
observers, and in general an attempt is being made to use policy towards the 
hydrocarbons sector as a consensus-building instrument, both between social 
classes and between regions: ’Finally’, declared the Minister for Hydrocarbons, 
Andres Soliz Rada on 26 June in the wake of a new deal to sell gas to Argentina at a 
higher price, ‘there is an idea which can unite the dispersed social sectors’
74; but 
whether this strategy will work is not obvious. For their part the aid donors, in spite of 
receiving some hysterical advice immediately after Morales’ accession
75, have not 
withdrawn their capital or returned to the kind of fiscal advice whose acceptance 
helped to destroy Sanchez de Losada; but the test will come when the oil price, 
which currently is functioning as a brake preventing the fiscal or the poverty situation 
from getting any worse, starts to fall again. 
 
  Our main argument, then, is that some elements within the cumulative 
processes which cause poverty to become self-reinforcing are political, and do not 
                                                 
69 ‘Mas problemas para Evo:protesta civica y huelga de hambre in Sucre’, reprint from El Mundo, 1 
September 2006,available on the internet at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/09/01/el mundo/i-
02301.htm 
70 This was a dispute between members of mining co-operatives and of a privatised mining company 
working on different levels of a tin mine in Huanuni, near Oruro, in which twelve miners were killed  
and more than 60 injured. The analysis of this incident in ‘Vuelve la Inestabilidad a Bolivia’, Pulso 
368(6-12October 2006),pp. 5 and 12-13, concludes that Bolivia has returned to ‘pure ungovernability’ 
and ‘is [once again] gently advancing towards the abyss.’ 
71 Andrew Mueller, ‘The cuddly crusader’[profile of Evo Morales], report in Independent on Sunday, 7 
May 2006. 
72 The prospectus for the Morales government’s new economic policy (Bolivia 2006) emphasises that 
policy towards multinationals will consist of ‘coexistence’(convivencia), not expropriation, and that 
collaboration with them is expected especially in import-substituting industrialisation based on the 
hydrocarbons sector (Bolivia 2006, pages 17  and 27  )  
73 At the time of writing (September 2006), foreign corporations have some $5.5 billion invested in 
Bolivia. 
74 ‘Reversing neoliberalism:an interview with Bolivia’s new Energy Minister’ at 
worldpress.org/article_id=2372. In the deal in question, the export price of gas to Argentina  was raised 
from $3.25 per million British Thermal Units (BTU) to $5 per BTU. 
75 See for example Michael Radu, ‘The end of Bolivia?’, December 21, 2005, at www. fpri.org.   34
reside in individual behaviour or even in ill-functioning institutions. We have identified 
and estimated four elements in the political poverty trap, some of which may be seen 
as Bolivia-specific and some of which are more general.  Although the bulk of this 
essay has been addressed to the specifics of the Bolivian case, our analysis also 
suggests that some of the requirements for effective adjustment in developing 
countries more broadly may have changed since the time of the OECD studies, 
precisely because the policy environment has become more liberalised and pro-poor 
and flows of capital more mobile. In particular the OECD’s advice to ignore calls for 
‘poverty-conscious adjustment’, on the grounds that it was not politically necessary, 
appears from this evidence to be now out of date; indeed on the Bolivian evidence 
what is needed is not only pro-poor adjustment, but adjustment to the right indicators 
of poverty and inequality- in particular what may be called ‘politicised unemployment’, 
as in El Alto. One aspect of poverty-conscious adjustment is poverty-conscious fiscal 
policy, as explicitly flouted by the Bolivian government of 2003. Another aspect is 
poverty-conscious institution-building, and there are lessons here from the 
comparative roles that microfinance was able to play in the Bolivian and Indonesian 
crises. In the light of changing global capital markets and policy priorities, the political 
requirements for a lasting  escape from crisis have changed greatly from what was 
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